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NOTES

Icarus and His Waxen Wings: Congress
Attempts to Address the Challenges of
Insider Trading in a Globalized
Securities Market
The boy, his heart with risk and rapture high,
Forsook his guide, aspiring to the sky,
And soared aloft: through nearness to the sun
The wax, that bound the wings, began to run ....
-Ovid, Metamorphoses
ABSTRACT

This Note addresses the globalization of the world financial securities
markets and the potentialfor fraud in these expanded markets. The author considers actual cases of insider trading that have crossed national
borders and the enforcement problems such cases raise. The author analyzes the first significant response by the United States Congress to these
problems and concludes that the response is inadequate. Congress recognizes the incrediblepace of evolution of the worldfinancial markets, but
is slow to address this process. The SEC offered serious proposalsto Congress-proposals that apparently have bipartisan support-and Congress failed to act on these proposalswithin a reasonable time. The author recommends that Congress adopt the SEC's current proposals in
this regard and that the United States should continue to negotiate multilateral cooperation agreements that regulate the globalized securities
markets and stop the abuses of insider trading.
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INTRODUCTION

In response1 to United States insider trading scandals 2 and other stock
market abuses on Wall Street, the United States Congress took a positive
step to restore public confidence in the integrity of the United States
stock market following "Black Monday" 8 by overwhelmingly passing 4

1. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 6043, 6044 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
2. Id. at 6048-51 (discussing the Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, and Stephen Wang
insider trading scandals); see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing Dennis Levine); 75 (discussing Ivan Boesky); 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing Stephen Wang). For a detailed discusion of the current state of the law on insider trading,

see generally D.

LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION (1990).

3. Monday, 19 October 1987, marked the worst day in Wall Street history. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average, a closely watched United States market barometer, collapsed more than five hundred points-approximately twenty-five percent-which represented nearly $500 billion in lost equity. See Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
4.' The bill passed in the United States House of Representatives by a vote of 410
yeas, 0 nays, 21 not voting. H.R. 5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. Rc. H7570
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988). The Senate passed H.R. 5133 by voice vote on 21 October
1988; President Reagan signed the bill into law on 19 November 1988. [2 1987-1988]
Cong. Index (CCH) 35,111.
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the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(Act). 5 Congress, recognizing that the securities markets are becoming
increasingly global and that much insider trading is conducted through
foreign entities,6 included in the Act a section (section 6) to enhance the
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) to cooperate with foreign securities authorities.'
Several articles8 and notes9 written in the past few years address the
problems, especially those of the enforcement of securities laws,'0 resulting from the rapid advancements toward globalization of the world financial and equity markets. Most recently, the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Government Operations submitted a report entitled Problems with the SEC's Enforcement of U.S. Securities
Laws in Cases Involving Suspicious Trades Originatingfrom Abroad."
This House Committee Report criticizes the SEC's attempts to investigate suspicious trades initiated outside the United States and makes several recommendations. 2 The Act and the House's recent criticisms of the
Commission represent the first congressional response to the inevitable
internationalization of the world financial community and the enforcement problems inherent in this rapid evolution.
This Note briefly discusses this internationalization.' 3 Part II presents

5. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28; see infra part II, section B.
7. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6, 102 Stat. 4677, 4681-82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78c(a), 78u(a) (1988)); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
8. The Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986);
Begin, A Proposed Blueprintfor Achieving Cooperation in PolicingTransborderSecurities Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 65 (1986).
9. Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 553 (1976); Note, InternationalCooperation in Insider Trading Cases, 40 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1149 (1983) [hereinafter WASH. & LEE Note]; Comment, The Future of
Global Securities Transactions:Blocking the Success of Market Links, 11 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 283 (1987).

10. See generally Ferrara & Nerke, Overview of an SEC Enforcement Action, 8
REv. 306 (1985).

CORP. L.

11.

H.R. REP. No. 1065, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter HousE

CRITICISM].

12. House Committee Report Critical of SEC's InternationalEnforcement, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1551 (Oct. 14, 1988); see infra part VI, section A
(discussing the recommendations of the Report). This Report was based on a fourteen
month study by the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Operations. Id.
13. Several recent articles exhaustively cover the internationalization of the world
financial community. See, e.g., supra notes 8-9. This subject, therefore, is discussed only
briefly to facilitate an understanding of the magnitude of the problems facing the SEC
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examples of how individuals have taken advantage of globalization to
effect illegal insider trading. Part III discusses the process of an SEC
investigation of suspicious trading, the problems encountered when the
trading becomes transnational, and the current methods of overcoming
those obstacles. This Note continues with an in-depth analysis of the
Act's provisions that are designed to facilitate international cooperation,
including a critique of the possible shortcomings of the new law and a
comparison with alternative proposals. Finally, the Note offers several
recommendations for improving the SEC's position in regulating internationalized markets and suggests that a multinational conventional response is the most desirable solution.
II.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS

A.

Indicia of Globalization

Securities market internationalization, the process of "closer integration of the major capital markets of the world," 4 will continue unless
there is a major financial or political eruption analogous to that in the
1930s. 15 In 1970, the New York Stock Exchange and the other United
States stock markets accounted for over two-thirds of the world's stock
value.1 The United States stock market is still twice as large as the
Tokyo stock market; if, however, Wall Street and Tokyo continue their
respective growth patterns over the past fifteen years, Tokyo will displace Wall Street as the world's largest stock market by 1993.17 Today,
the United States can claim only eight of the world's thirty largest companies in six major financial sectors. 8
Individual stock exchanges continue to evolve and to develop "links"
with other stock markets, and the SEC encourages the development of
intermarket links and transnational trading. 9 These links are primarily
and the possible remedial effect of the Act's section 6 concerning international
cooperation.
14. Debs, The Development of InternationalEquity Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 5, 6
(1986).
15. Id.
16. Shopkorn, Global Trading: The Current and Future Impact on United States
Markets and United States Portfolio Managers, 4 B.U. ITr'L L.J. 25, 25 (1986).
17. Id. Market capitalization in the United States is approximately $2 trillion. Tokyo could claim only five percent of the world's capitalization in 1970, but by 1987 that
amount had climbed to twenty-one percent. Id.
18. Id. The six major sectors listed by Shopkorn are automobiles, banking, chemicals, electrical equipment, food processing, and steel. Id.
19. Mann & Sullivan, Current Issues in InternationalSecurities Law Enforcement,
in PRACTISING

LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE

1987, at 769,
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between United States and Canadian markets, 20 but negotiations to develop market links have occurred between Wall Street, London, Amsterdam,21 and Tokyo.22
In April 1988, the United Kingdom authorized the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) to
transact trades in the United Kingdom, making NASDAQ the first foreign stock market allowed to trade in that state.2 3 Because of these growing links between the United States and London markets, the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the Securities Association
of London agreed to an information exchange, particularly regarding securities registration and disciplinary information about individuals and
firms involved in the securities and investment business. 2 '
Japanese links evolved much more slowly, even though former SEC
Chairman David Ruder urged greater cooperation between the Japanese
and United States securities markets while he was with the SEC. 25 The

Japanese Government will soon allow its banks to conduct foreign fu-

777 (Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series, No. 561, 1987).
20. Id. at 775. The Boston Stock Exchange (BSE) is linked with the Montreal Stock
Exchange (MSE). This link allows an MSE specialist to send orders to a BSE specialist
for a few Canadian issues listed in the United States and the 1150 United States issues
listed in the Intermarket Trading System. Id.; see also Exchange Act Release No. 21499,
49 Fed. Reg. 44,575 (Nov. 1, 1984); Exchange Act Release No. 21925, 50 Fed. Reg.
14,480 (Apr. 8, 1985). The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) is linked with the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). See Exchange Act Release No. 22442, 50 Fed. Reg.
39,201 (Sept. 27, 1985). The Midwest Stock Exchange is also linked with the TSE. See
Exchange Act Release No. 23075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854 (Mar. 28, 1986). Further links
are proposed between the two markets. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 775.
21. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 776.

22. Gira, Toward A Global CapitalMarket: The Emergence of Simultaneous Multinational Securities Offerings, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 157, 158 (1987).
23. NASDAQ Is First Foreign Exchange Recognized by British Authorities, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 598 (Apr. 22, 1988). As part of the United Kingdom's
"Big Bang," which commenced with the passage of the Financial Services Act of 1986,
Britain may recognize a foreign exchange that is a "Recognized Investment Exchange"
with adequate investor protection. Id. United Kingdom Corporate Affairs Minister
Francis Maude declared, "We attach great significance to the desire of [NASDAQ) to
operate in the United Kingdom, because it emphasizes the importance of the City of
London in the International Financial marketplace." Id. at 599. The NASDAQLondon connection allows trading to pass freely from Europe to North America. Id.
24. NASD, London SRO Agree to Information Exchange, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 42, at 1637 (Oct. 28, 1988).

25. Ruder Urges Greater Cooperation Between U.S., Japanese Stock Markets, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 261 (Feb. 19, 1988). Chairman Ruder argued
that greater cooperation would lead to both "increased efficiency and capital availability"
for both Japan and the United States. Id.
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tures and options trading for individual investors, 26 and seven Japanese
banks have already become members of either the Chicago Board of
Trade or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 7 Further, the Japanese
Ministry of Finance decided to allow forty percent of new ten-year Japanese Government bonds to be sold through a price auction system. 28
This development will improve the "competitive opportunities" of foreign market participants in Japan.2"
The links between the Canadian, United States, and London markets,
as well as the liberalization of the Japanese markets, enhance the evolving twenty-four hour trading day.30 This expansion of markets has resulted in a substantial increase in the amount of United States equities
bought and sold by foreigners. 1 Foreign investors bought and sold
$481.9 billion worth in equities, eighteen percent of the value of all
transactions in the United States stock markets during 1987.32 This represents an eighteen-fold increase over 1977, when foreigners bought and
sold only $25.6 billion worth in United States stock.33 The increase in
activity almost doubled during the periods 1985-86 and 1986-87."' Al26. JapaneseFinance Ministry to Permit Trading in Overseas Futures, Options, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1328 (Aug. 26, 1988). This move is part of the
efforts of the Japanese Ministry of Finance to liberalize further both Japanese banking
and securities industries.
27. Id. at 1329. The Japanese Government will also allow the banks to trade on the
Singapore International Financial Monetary Exchange and the London International Financial Futures Exchange. The Chicago Board of Trade began listing Japanese Government bond futures and a Tokyo Stock Exchange Index future in 1989. Id. The SEC has
agreed not to block the offer of a "future" based on the price-weighted index of 225
stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 777.
28. Japan Will Use Price Auction System to Sell 40 Percentof New 10-Year Bonds,
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1401 (Sept. 16, 1988).
29, Id. at 1402.
30. See generally Hunter, The Status and Evolution of Twenty-Four Hour Trading: A Trader's View of InternationalTransactions,Clearance,and Settlement, 4 B.U.
INT'L L. J. 15 (1986). The "24-hour book"-trading by large securities firms and institutions in their own positions-is possible because, when the London Exchange is open,
its hours overlap with the opening of Wall Street and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and
the Pacific Exchange's hours overlap the opening of the Tokyo Exchange. Wall Street,
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Pacific Exchange have all expanded their hours of
operation, and these markets, as well as the London Exchange, are considering even
further expansion of hours to facilitate international trading. See id.; see also Debs,
supra note 14, at 9.
31. HousE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 3. The statistics were provided to Congress
by the United States Treasury Department.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. 1985 volume was $159 billion, 1986 volume was $277.5 billion, and 1987
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though not as large, the United States investment in foreign equities totalled $101.2 billion during 1986." 5
In this discussion of the empirical indicia of the globalization of securities markets, the reader should note that several factors may combine to
be the underlying forces behind globalization. 8 One commentator, Richard Debs, opined that the volatility of exchange rates is possibly the most
important factor." Debs also lists high interest rates as a motivating factor.18 Probably the most frequently cited factor is the' rapid progress in

computer telecommunications technology, especially in the securities
arena. 9 The phenomenon that Debs refers to as the "institutionalization
of the markets" 40 is a moving force in this process. Finally, there has
been a philosophical and political move toward deregulation,4 1 the objective of which is to "remove constraints on competition ....
[P]hilosophically this applies to foreign competition as well as domestic
so that market forces will work." 2 This deregulation has occurred in the

volume was $481.9 billion. Also of interest, the dollar amount of purchases was more
than the dollar amount of sales. 1986 purchases outstripped sales by $18.7 billion, and
1987 purchases exceeded sales by $16 billion. Id.
35. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 774.
36. Debs, supra note 14, at 6-7; see Shopkorn, supra note 16, at 26-27.
37. Debs, supra note 14, at 6. "[T]he volatility in exchange rates . . . has driven
people to consider currency. Moreover, it would be negligent on the part of any major
investor or issuer who is able to do so, not to take into account foreign currency considerations and foreign investments or markets that might be available outside the United
States." Id.
38. Id. at 7. These rates are high relative to both historical standards, which reflect
the inflationary times of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the monetary policy of the
Federal Reserve Board begun in October 1979, which has increased the sensitivity of
interest rates to an all-time high.
39. See, e.g., id. at 7; see Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 774; see also HOUSE
CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 3.
40. Debs, supra note 14, at 7. Debs is referring to a trend whereby savings are
pooled by intermediation through larger institutions, including, for example, pension
funds and insurance companies. "These larger institutional investors have the sophistication, the ability, the interest, and the machinery to have access to all markets of the world
through a variety of financial institutions." Id.
41. Id. at 7; see also Shopkorn, supra note 16, at 26.
42. Debs, supra note 14, at 7. Debs cautions that this deregulation may not be permanent, because governments may change. Consider, for example, what would happen if
the Labour Party were to gain control in the United Kingdom. Also, there has been
increased talk in Congress pointing to further regulation of commercial banks. Id. Debs
does not believe government is entirely responsible for the deregulation of the past five to
ten years; instead, he claims that market forces are primarily responsible, with "the regulators, the legislators, and the supervisors ... a couple of steps behind the market participants," and that these groups have only generally accommodated what the market al-
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United States, Britain, Japan, ' Germany, and Australia."'
The markets are expanding,4 5 and the SEC recently issued a policy
statement on the regulation of international markets, which sets forth the
principles and goals that it considers central to achieving a "truly global
market system."'46 The policy has three main points: (1) efficient struc49
48
tures; 47 (2) sound disclosure systems; and (3) fair and honest markets.
The statement focuses on the need for transnational agreements that will
prevent insider traders from shielding themselves and their profits from
the laws of the state affected. 50 Until laws and regulatory systems are
reconciled, the continued growth and viability of markets are

threatened. 5
B.

Actual Cases of Foreign-OriginatedInsider Trading

The internationalization of the world financial markets, which has
produced a significant increase in foreign transactions in United States
stock markets, 52 has also produced a significant increase in United States
securities law violations.5 3 Professor Hurd5 testified before Congress
that because acts that violate United States securities laws are not illegal
in other states,5" and in some states these acts are not even considered
ready has established. Id.
43. Id.
44. Shopkorn, supra note 16, at 26.
45. Debs, supra note 14, at 10.
46. SEC Sets Policy on Regulation of International Markets, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(OH) No. 1312, pt. 1, at 3 (Nov. 16, 1988). SEC Chairman David Ruder presented
the policy statement at the Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissi~ns in Melbourne, Australia. Id.
47. Id. The SEC recommended efficient structures for quotation, price, and volume
information dissemination; order routing; execution; clearance; settlement; and payment.
The system also needs strong capital adequacy standards. Id.
48. Id. Sound disclosure systems refers to accounting principles, auditing standards,
auditor independence standards, registration and prospectus provisions, and listing standards. Id.
49. Id. The establishment of fair and honest markets requires a high level of enforcement cooperation. Id.
50. Commission Issues Policy Statement on InternationalSecurities Regulation, 20
Sec. Reg. & L,Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1753, 1754 (Nov. 18, 1988).
51. See Debs, supra note 14, at 10.
52. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
53. See generally HousE CRrrIctsM, supra note 11.
54. Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, Syracuse University. Id. at 3.
55. Switzerland only recently outlawed insider trading. Swiss ParliamentAgrees on
Insider Trading Compromise, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 7. This is
especially important because the Swiss will generally relax their bank secrecy laws only
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undesirable, it "would strain credulity" to believe that illegal activity has
not kept pace with the process of internationalization. 6 Harvey Pitt, a
former General Counsel of the SEC, testified that "foreign [insider trading] cases challenge the [SEC]'s investigative staff far more than even
domestic investigations do."' 57 These trades usually originate in states
with bank secrecy58 or blocking statutes,5 9 both of which seriously impede SEC investigations because these statutes prevent disclosure of6 0rele°
vant information.- These impediments are furthered by "layering.
The Dennis Levine case is a perfect example of the relative ease of
avoiding SEC detection." Levine's method was simple. He opened a
bank aceount in a Bahamian bank to effect insider trades in over fifty
securities from 1980 to 1985. Bahamian secrecy laws protected Levine's
identity. Indeed, no one discovered his activity until a brokerage firm
received an anonymous tip and passed it on to the SEC. 2 The House
Committee on Government Operations describes the seriousness of the
problem:
If Levine had "layered" his trading by using another bank in a different

in situations in which the activity in question is considered a crime in Switzerland. Note,

Swiss Bank Secrecy and United States Efforts to Obtain Informationfrom Swiss Banks,
21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1988); see infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text
(explaining secrecy laws).
56. HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 3-4.
57. Id. at 4. Pitt observered:
I think there is consensus that dramatic changes in the world securities markets
have provided new and fertile opportunities for the unscrupulous and the dishonest. The globalization of the securities markets and almost continuous introduction
of new financial instruments have introduced greater rewards at seemingly less
risk for those who ... conceal their wrongdoing behind ... nondisclosure laws.
Id.
58. Id. ("It is relatively easy for individuals and entities to open accounts with foreign banks or brokerages, which can then place trades on U.S. markets without revealing
the identities of their clients.") (testimony of SEC Chairman Ruder); see infra notes
106-15 and accompanying text (discussing BSI case); see also infra notes 96-101 and
accompanying text (discussing bank secrecy laws).
59. HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 4; see infra notes 96-98, 102-05 and accompanying text (describing blocking statutes).
60. HousE CRricisM, supra note 11, at 5. The text accompanying note 63 defines
layering. For a more complete analysis of the obstacles to SEC investigations, see infra
part III, section A.
61. HousE CRrrIcIsM, supra note 11, at 6. On the Dennis Levine case, see Wise,

Levine Sentence Seen in Line with Insider-TradingPenalties, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1987,
at 1, col. 3; Brill, Insider TradingScandal: Death of a Career,N.J.L.J., Jan. 8, 1987,
at 1, col. 1.
62. HousE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 6 n.10.
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bank secrecy country, such as Panama or Liechtenstein, and then had instructed that bank to place orders through the Bahamian bank involved,
his massive fraud-the disclosure of which led to his cooperation with the
SEC that resulted in the insider trading conviction of Ivan Boesky-may
have gone uninvestigated by the SEC."8

Dennis Levine's method of avoiding detection is not new. Congress recognized this problem as early as 1970, when it acknowledged the
"proliferation of 'white collar' crime" resulting from the use by United
States citizens and others of secret foreign bank accounts. 4
The Commission brought two actions in 1981, SEC v. Banca della
Svizzera Italiana (St. Joe)"5 and SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers
(Santa Fe),"6 which were the first major cases combating the use of secret foreign bank accounts to conduct insider securities trading in the
United States. St. Joe involved a transaction producing an overnight
profit of $2 million in which all the insider trades were conducted
through Swiss accounts.6 Certain procedural steps, possible because of
unique circumstances, eventually revealed the defendants' identities.6
Santa Fe was a $7.8 million 9 insider trading case in which, like the
transaction in the St. Joe case, all of the trades were conducted through
secret Swiss bank accounts.7 0 This case represented the first successful

63. Id. at 6.
64. SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana (St. Joe), 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4397).
65. Id. at 111.
66. [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,484 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1986).
67. St. Joe, 92 F.R.D. at 113. Options and stock of St. Joe Minerals Corp. were
purchased one day before Joseph E. Seagram & Sons announced a $45 per share tender
offer. Id. at 112. Before Seagram's tender offer, St. Joe shares were trading at approximately $30 per share. Id.
68. SEC, Request For Comments Concerning a Concept to Improve the Commission's Ability to Investigate and Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities in
the U.S. Markets from Other Countries (Release No. 21186, File No. S7-27-84, July
30, 1984) [hereinafter SEC Request], reprinted in 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
31, at 1305, 1308 (Aug. 3, 1984); see infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
69. [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,484 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1986). At that time, this case was the largest insider trading case ever brought by the
SEC. Id. The case against Ivan Boesky is currently the largest insider trading case ever
brought by the SEC. See infra note 75.
70. Defendant's transactions were similar to the trades in the St. Joe case. Id. The
"certain unknown purchasers" bought 17,000 shares of common stock and 3500 call options carrying the rights to buy 350,000 shares of common stock of Santa Fe International just before Kuwait Petroleum announced a $51 per share takeover bid. Prior to
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attempt by the SEC to obtain assistance from the Swiss Government in
the discovery of the identity of Swiss bank customers. 1
The 1986 case of SEC v. Katz 2 was the next significant case involving the use of Swiss bank accounts. The SEC discovered the identity of
the Swiss bank customers by invoking the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 73 between the United States and Switzerland, making

Katz the first action in which the SEC could take advantage of that
agreement.7 4
In 1988, the SEC cracked the second largest 5 insider trading case to
date. SEC v. Wang"6 focused on the tips of Stephen Sui-Kuan Wang, 7a
Morgan Stanley & Co. analyst, to Taiwanese national Fred Lee,

the takeover bid, the stock sold for $24.75. The unknown purchasers parlayed $750,000
into $6.2 million virtually overnight. The unknown purchasers were determined to be
Darius N. Keaton, a director of Santa Fe, and his tippees. Id.
71. Id. The assistance of the Swiss Government was not wholly voluntary. The SEC
was forced to have the United States Justice Department file a request pursuant to a
treaty with Switzerland for the production of evidence. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, done May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019,
T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Mutual Assistance
Treaty]. Switzerland's highest court twice considered and denied the United States request, but on appeal to the Federal Council, Switzerland's highest political body, the
United States successfully secured the necessary authorization to obtain the secret customer identities. Santa Fe, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,484.
72. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,867 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 1986). Marcel Katz, an analyst with the investment banking firm Lazard, Freres &
Co., obtained material, nonpublic information about the upcoming merger between RCA
and General Electric. He tipped his father, Harvey, who then tipped Elie Mordo, a
foreigner, who took advantage of the information by effectuating a stock transaction
through his Swiss bank account. Id.
73. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading,
done Aug. 31, 1982, Switzerland-United States [hereinafter Swiss MOU], reprinted in
22 I.L.M. 1 (1982), and in 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1737 (Oct. 8,
1982); see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
74. Katz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,867.
75. The case against Ivan Boesky is the largest insider trading case to date. As a
result of the disposition of that action, Boesky paid a $100 million fine, was banned
permanently from the securities industry, and was sentenced to three years in jail. SEC
Charges Taiwanese Businessman in Second Largest Insider Trading Case, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1015 (July 1, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Charges];see also
Wise, Prosecutors,Defense Lawyers View Boesky Sentence as Fair: 3-Year Term Stiffest
for Insider Trading, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
76. SEC v. Wang, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,802
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1988); see SEC Charges, supra note 75, at 1015.
77. Lee paid Wang $200,000 for nonpublic, material information concerning twenty-
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which resulted in alleged profits to Lee of more than $19 million.7 8 SEC
Chairman David Ruder testified before Congress that negotiations were
underway pursuant to the United States-Swiss MOU 79 to obtain evidence about Lee and to freeze any assets that he might have in Switzerland."0 Lee may also be liable under Switzerland's new laws against insider trading.8 1

The Levine case, Santa Fe, St. Joe, Katz, and Wang demonstrate the
techniques available for exploiting the internationalized securities markets. The globalization of markets is continuing, but that process is also
producing an environment conducive to international crime. 2 Although
critics recently condemned the Commission for its enforcement role, or
lack thereof, in the global markets, 3 questions still remain concerning
the rules of the globalized market and the SEC's role in that market.
III.

INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED STATES
SECURITIES LAWS

A.

Barriers to Global Investigation

There are three basic steps to an SEC investigation: (1) identification
of a violation; (2) compilation of relevant evidence of that violation; and
(3) prosecution of the violators. 84 Self-regulatory organizations usually

five issuers involved with mergers, acquisitions, or leveraged buyouts. Former Securities
Analyst Sentenced over Role in Insider TradingScheme, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 42, at 1634 (Oct. 28, 1988) [hereinafter Former Securities Analyst]. Wang subsequently settled the civil charges and pleaded guilty to a criminal charge, receiving a three
year jail sentence. Id.
78. SEC Charges,supra note 75, at 1015. The court froze $3 million held in Lee's
account at Charles Schwab & Co. Former Securities Analyst, supra note 77, at 1634.
The court also froze $12.5 million in Lee's accounts with Standard Chartered Bank,
which has branches in both Hong Kong and New York. Id.
79. Swiss MOU, supra note 73; see also infra note 120.
80. Domm, Wang Case Signals More Insider Trading, Reuter News Reports, July
3,1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, REUTER File).
81. U.S. Insider Trading Figure Could Be Liable Under Swiss Law, Reuter Business Report, June 30, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, BUSRPT File). SEC Enforcement Division Director Gary Lynch told Reuters that Swiss laws would apply against
Lee. These laws make it illegal to pass corporate secrets to another party who would
trade on the information. Id.
82. See Domm, supra note 80. As of 3 July 1988, the SEC was investigating over
forty cases of suspect foreign securities trading. Id.
83. HOUSE CRrIICISM, supra note 11, at 7-11.
84. Cox, Internationalizationof the CapitalMarkets: The Experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 MD. J. INr'L L. & TRADE 201, 215 (1987).
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identify potential violations,8 5 and then refer these violations to the Commission." Once a possible violation is referred to it, the SEC begins an
investigation if it determines that such action is warranted. When the
transaction is transnational, the search for evidence may be fruitless. A
restriction in the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 limits the service of
process and subpoena power of the SEC to "any place in the United
States,""' and this limitation is a serious impediment to effective regulation of securities markets. 9 If a witness or potential defendant is outside
the United States, in personam jurisdiction may not exist and, therefore,
no further discovery would be possible.90 This was the result in one recent situation in which the SEC identified substantial violations of the
securities laws and the identities of the foreign traders involved;9" the
SEC could not pursue any action to redress the wrong for two reasons:
the investors refused to cooperate, and service was impossible because
neither defendant was within the reach of a United States court. 2 The
SEC's primary investigative tool is the subpoena, and Professor Hurd93
testified to Congress that this tool is ineffective in international trading
cases for two reasons:
First, U.S. courts are reluctant to order U.S. individuals or business organizations residing or doing business abroad to comply with subpoenas issued in the United States when compliance with a subpoena would violate

85. Self-regulatory organizations (SRO) are groups, such as the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, that conduct market surveillance. SROs are the first line of detection of illegal activity.
86. HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 7.
87. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1988).
89. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 779-80. "[T]he case law demonstrates that,
where a witness is beyond the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts, discovery can be
avoided despite the fact that U.S. subject matter jurisdiction exists." Id. at 780; cf.CFTC
v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (addressing similar problems under the Commodity Exchange Act).
90. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 780.
91. HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 30. The Commission identified two Middle
Eastern individuals who traveled to Europe, opened up a bank account, and apparently
traded on inside information a couple of days before Chicago Pacific announced its takeover of Textron. The two investors bought 124,750 shares of Textron common stock,
which was three times the average trading volume of the stock. The two investors, who
did not have a prior history of investing in the United States market, realized $629,264
in profits when they sold their stock a couple of days after the public announcement of
the takeover. Id. at 30-31.
92. Id. at 31.
93. See supra note 54.
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a secrecy or blocking law["4 ] of the host nation. Second, U.S. courts do not
have the power to enforce an order requiring foreign nationals in their
own countries to comply with a subpoena issued in the United States.95
The most serious constraints preventing the Commission's effective enforcement of the securities laws are the blocking and secrecy laws enacted in other states."' Congress recognized the potential effects of these
laws two decades ago, 97 and their effect was the central issue in Santa
Fe. 8 Secrecy laws provide for confidentiality of specific information.99
The basis for secrecy laws reflects national public policy regarding banking relationships, which is analogous to the national public policy behind
the attorney-client privilege in the United States. 10 0 Secrecy laws protect
parties in privity, while blocking statutes protect states' interests.101
Blocking statutes restrict the flow of certain types of information out of
the jurisdiction. One commentator presents two rationales for blocking
statutes: first, to prevent disclosure of information by the state's nationals
involved in United States litigation; and second, "to prevent the United
States government from conducting investigations and imposing its regulations within [the state's] borders."10' 2 Canada recently enacted a block-

94. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (describing bank secrecy and
blocking statutes).
95. House CRrrICISM, supra note 11, at 31; of. CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487. But
cf.7 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). Congress enacted 7 U.S.C. § 15 as a response to Nahas, which
foreclosed the Commission from serving subpoenas on persons outside the United States.
See H.R. REP. No. 624, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6005, 6010; see also Futures Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, §
103, 100 Stat. 3556, 3557 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)). "Many countries have
objected to the enactment of this provision as an 'extraterritorial' power for the CFTC.
This power has yet to be exercised." Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 783; see also
17 C.F.R. § 21.03(c), (e)(1) (1989).
96. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which these
laws were at issue).
97. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4394, 4397; see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 66, 69-71 and accompanying text.
99. Such information would include banking, manufacturing, or business secrets. See
Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 809, 812. The Swiss Penal Code penalizes bank
associates who breach client confidentiality. The criminal act "characterize[s] the interest
in secrecy as being personal to the parties." Id. at 812. If the principal is Swiss, a breach
of confidentiality is "an offense against the state." Id. at 813.
100. Comment, supra note 9, at 294.
101. Id. at 294-95.
102. Id. at 295. Foreign governments design blocking statutes to prevent the extraterritorial application of United States substantive law. See M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 369 (2d ed. 1986).

1990]

INTERNATIONAL INSIDER TRADING

ing statute that theoretically could hinder an otherwise excellent relationship between Canada's provincial securities agencies and the SEC. 0 3
The SEC, however, received assurances from the Ontario Securities
Commission that the blocking statute probably will not be used to prevent the passage of evidence to a United States court because insider
trading and market manipulation are also illegal in Canada.'" National
10 5
sovereignty is therefore not at issue.
B.

PresentMethods of Enforcement

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana (St.Joe)'0 6 circumvented
the Swiss secrecy laws by applying Rule 37 of the United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 07 and the balancing approach of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations (Restatement).108 Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) effected trades for common stock and options of St.
Joe Minerals (St. Joe) prior to a tender offer by Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons. The transactions resulted in overnight profits for BSI of $2 million. The SEC, recognizing that such short-swing profits indicate a
strong probability of inside trading, froze BSI's New York bank accounts
and served formal interrogatories on BSI requesting the identity of the

103. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 777-78; see Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. F-29 (1985).
104. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 778-79.
105. See id.
106. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York because BSI does business in New York City. Id. at 112.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965). Section 40
provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interest of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
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principals for whom the bank bought and sold the St. Joe stock. 10 9 BSI
refused to comply with the discovery request and claimed that it would
be subject to criminal sanctions under Swiss law if the information were
released."' The SEC filed an action for an order pursuant to Rule 37 to
force BSI to provide the requested information."' The district court applied the Restatement's balancing approach and ruled in favor of the
Commission.11 2 Judge Pollack wrote:
BSI acted in bad faith. It made deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law
to evade in a commercial transaction for profit to it, the strictures of
American securities law against insider trading. Whether acting solely as
an agent or also as a principal (something which can only be clarified
through disclosure of the requested information), BSI invaded American
securities markets and profited in some measure thereby. It cannot rely on
Swiss nondisclosure law to shield this activity."1
"BSI, fearful of . . .significant fines, received a waiver of the secrecy
laws from its principles [sic]," which allowed it to disclose the requested
information. 1 4 The SEC succeeded in St. Joe, but it understood that the
use of Rule 37 "is viewed as hostile by foreign governments" and that
case by case adjudication to compel production of evidence is not "an
effective deterrent to securities laws violators."1 5
The Commission also takes advantage of bilateral 1 6 and multilateral 17 agreements for the production of evidence, but these agreements
are not altogether effective. One principle limitation is that the agreements are criminal in nature,'1 8 whereas the SEC normally files civil
actions."' These agreements also limit cooperation; if the state involved
has blocking statutes or secrecy laws, cooperation may not be available.
109. St. Joe, 92 F.R.D. at 113.
110. Id. at 117.
111. Id. at 112.
112. Id.at 119.
113. Id.at 117 (footnote omitted).
114. Comment, supra note 9, at 311.
115. SEC Request, supra note 68, at 1308.
116. See, e.g., Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 71; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, done June 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, - U.S.T.
-, T.I.A.S. No. 10734 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1983); Treaty on Extradition and
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, done June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32
U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981).
117. The Hague Convention for the Taking of Evidence Abroad, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into
force Oct. 7, 1972).
118. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 814.
119. Id.
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Furthermore, insider trading is not illegal in many states; this fact formerly prevented the Commission's use of the Swiss Mutual Assistance
120
Treaty.
The use of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) provides the
most effective technique of international securities enforcement. Following St. Joe and the inapplicability of the United States-Swiss Mutual
Assistance Treaty due to the dual criminality 'requirement, the United
States negotiated and signed an MOU with the Swiss. 12 ' The Commission has entered into MOUs with Switzerland, 2 2 Canada, Japan, the
Cayman Islands, the United Kingdom, and Brazil. 123 The Commission
is currently negotiating MOUs with France, Italy, New Zealand, and
Australia, while also pursuing agreements with both West Germany and
Hong Kong.' 24 The MOU is very important to the SEC's continued
oversight of the markets. The Commission rarely pursues potential insider trading violations when the trading in question originates from
1 25
states that have not entered into an MOU with the United States.
Trades originating in Panama, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and Monaco
are appropriate examples because these states have blocking or secrecy

120. See Switzerland: Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning Judicial Assistance
in the Santa Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785, 796-98 (1983) (reproducing an English summary
of the opinion of the Swiss Supreme Court); see also Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra
note 71, art. 4(2)(a). Dual criminality was a requirement for assistance under this pact,
but the Swiss have since banned insider trading. The new Swiss law will enhance the
Commission's ability to utilize the 1977 Mutual Assistance Treaty. See Swiss Parliament Agrees on Insider Trading Compromise, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at
7, 7-8 (Jan. 8, 1988) (quoting Michael Mann, SEC, Associate Director for International
Affairs, Enforcement Division).
121. The first use of the United States-Swiss MOU was in SEC v. Katz, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,867; see supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text; infra note 160 (describing the requirement of dual criminality).
122. The Swiss MOU expired upon the enactment of the Swiss insider trading law.
The parties to the MOU agreed that once insider trading was made illegal in Switzerland, assistance would be established pursuant to the 1977 Mutual Assistance Treaty,

supra note 67;

HOUSE

CRTCISM,

supra note 11, at 22 n.41 and accompanying text.

123. HOUSE CRrIICISM, supra note 11, at 22; see also Szekely, U.S.-U.K. Sign Securities Law Enforcement Agreement, Reuters North European Service, Sept. 23, 1986
(LEXIS, NEXIS Library, REUTER File). For an in-depth analysis of these MOUs,
see Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Recent Accords which Facilitate Transnational SEC Investigations of Insider Trading, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 243
(1987).
124. See Cooney, SEC Holding Enforcement Talks with Four More Countries,
Reuters Library Report, May 19, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, SECURITIES File).
125. HOUSE CRmCISm, supra note 11, at 18-19.
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laws.126 Nineteen of the twenty-five states that represent the highest dollar amounts of trading in United States stocks are not party to an infor1 7
mation-sharing agreement with the United States.
MOUs are vitally important to the development of fair and honest
markets.1 28 The pact signed recently with Canada's provincial securities
regulators, the model for future MOUs, 2 9 provides for the most extensive cooperation to date."' Under that agreement, either state may compel the other to conduct investigations, including the procurement of testimony and documents, in their respective jurisdictions."" Although the
Swiss MOU is no longer in force, that agreement provided for the dis1 32
covery of bank account customer identities.
The MOU is currently the centerpiece of the SEC's international enforcement methods.1 33 The SEC needs more statutory authority to facilitate these agreements. The United States-Canadian MOU formalizes an
existing ad hoc relationship, 3 but the agreement is ineffectual until
Congress grants additional authority to the Commission. 3 The signatories therefore agreed to take "reasonable steps to obtain the necessary
authorization."' 36

126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 9.

128. The United States-Swiss MOU was recognized as an important development
for international securities regulation which "could provide a basis for further international cooperation in insider trading cases." WASH. & LEE Note, supra note 9, at 1171.
129. See Cooney, supra note 124.

130. Szekely, U.S., Canada in Far-Reaching Securities Law Enforcement Pact,
Reuters Business Report, Jan. 7, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, SECURITIES File).
131. Id. The MOU has been the target of criticism in Canada, including a constitutional attack on its validity. The principle argument against the MOU's validity focuses

on provincial powers, and the validity of the Ontario Securities Act. See infra note 180
and accompanying text.
132. See Swiss MOU, supra note 73, arts. 3-6.
133. HousE CRrrcISM, supra note 11, at 11. Congress criticizes the focus on the

MOU and has proposed additional measures for implementation. Id.; see infra part V,
section A. Furthermore, the United States-Swiss MOU is limited in that only the SEC
or the Justice Department has access to the information provided under the agreement;
therefore, private litigants potentially injured by illegal trading may not utilize the information. WASH. & LEE Note, supra note 9, at 1171.
134. SEC, CanadianProvinces Sign Securities Enforcement Accord, 20 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 17 (Jan. 8, 1988).
135. See Cooney, supra note 124.
136. SEC to Seek Authority to Conduct Probes at Request of Foreign Gov'ts, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 676, 677 (May 6, 1988) [hereinafter SEC to Seek
Authority].
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THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF

1988

A. The Initial Proposal
The Commission formally introduced a proposal to Congress in June
137
1988, seeking expanded powers to tackle insider trading problems.
The proposal constituted the first comprehensive legislative effort to address the globalization of securities markets." 8 The proposed bill would
authorize the SEC: (1) to conduct, at its own discretion, investigations in
the United States at the request of a foreign state; (2) to withhold information provided by a foreign state from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA);3 9 (3) to provide information and evidence to a foreign government; and (4) to restrict or to impose sanctions
on a security professional who acts improperly in a foreign state and
who tries to conduct business in the United States." ° The SEC believes
that foreign governments will grant similar authority to their respective
securities regulatory bodies; the SEC and its counterparts, however, currently yield this power only when their own laws are violated.141 The
14
power sought enhances the negotiation and formation of more MOUs.
The United States Departments of State and Justice both supported the
legislative proposal.14 3 The Justice Department further commented that
the bill is "exceptionally important to law enforcement efforts in
144
general."'

137.
L. Rep.
138.
139.
140.

141.

SEC ProposesInternationalSecurities Enforcement CooperationAct, Fed. Sec.
(CCH) No. 1290, pt. 1 (June 15, 1988).
Id. at 1.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
SEC to Seek Authority, supra note 136, at 676-77.

SEC Asks for Power to Help Foreign Investigators, Reuter Financial Report,

June 7, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, FINRPT File).
142. Id. "When we want information from a foreign country we're not in a position
to offer reciprocal treitment and that provides a real stumbling block." Id. (statement of
Michael Mann, SEC, Office of International Legal Assistance). SEC Chairman David
Ruder claimed, "[Plassage of this legislation would... enhance international cooperation
and coordination among securities regulators around the world." Increased Cooperation
Needed in InternationalMarkets, Ruder Says, 20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38,
at 1480, 1481 (Sept. 30, 1988) (quoting Chairman Ruder).

143. U.S. Departments Back SEC Call for More Authority, Reuter Financial Report, Aug. 3, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, SECURITIES File) [hereinafter U.S.

Departments].
144. Id. (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Justice
Department, Criminal Division).
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On 21 June 1988, Senator Donald Riegle 1 5 introduced the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988 (Senate Bill). 146
The Senate Bill emanated from the Commission's proposal, with the exception that the Senate Bill required reciprocal treatment by the foreign
state requesting assistance. 11 On 29 June 1988, Representative John
Dingell introduced 14 8 the SEC's proposal in its entirety to the House of
Representatives (House Bill).14 9 The House Bill did not require reciprocal assistance by a foreign state requesting investigatory assistance from
the SEC. SEC Chairman David Ruder addressed the reciprocity issue in
his testimony before a House subcommittee,150 stating that the Commission needs the discretion to assist a foreign securities agency "regardless
of whether there is assured reciprocity."1 51 Chairman Ruder envisioned
two situations in which the SEC might desire to aid the foreign agency
even if similar assistance were unavailable in the requesting agency's
state: first, a situation in which the SEC needs to protect directly

145. Senator Riegle (D-Mich.) chairs the Senate Banking and Securities
Subcommittee.
146. S.2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). A full copy of the Senate Bill, and a
report submitted to the Senate by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs may be found in S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1300, pt. 2 (Aug. 24, 1988) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
147. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(b)(2)(B), reprinted in SENATE REPORT,
supra note 146, at 35-36. The Senate Banking Committee approved the bill on 27 July
1988. Senate Panel Approves Bill to Let SEC Assist ForeignSecurities Agencies, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1209. Senator Riegle commented that "[a]s a result [of
current law], the [Commission] has been unable to use its authority in the U.S. to assist
its foreign counterparts with their investigations.... We also lack a requirement that the
foreign authority return the favor. The SEC accordingly has little leverage when requesting aid for its own investigations." Riegle Introduces Bill to Allow SEC to Assist
Foreign Investigators, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 982 (June 24, 1988).
148. See Dingell Introduces Bill to Encourage InternationalEnforcement Cooperation, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1065 (July 8, 1988). Representative
Dingell (D-Mich.) cosponsored the House Bill with Representatives Edward Markey
(D-Mass.), Norman Lent (R-N.Y.), and Matthew Rinaldo (R-N.J.). Id. at 1066.
149. H.R. 4945, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
150. Chairman Ruder appeared before the House Energy and Commerce Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee. Ruder Says SEC Should Have Flexibility in
Assisting Foreign Securities Agencies, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1236
(Aug. 5, 1988) [hereinafter Ruder Says].
151, Id. But see U.S. Departments, supra note 143. Mary Mochary, Deputy Legal
Adviser at the State Department, testified before the Subcommittee that the State Department agreed with the SEC's approach, but that "the department believe[d] that cooperation in this area should be reciprocal, and that our law enforcement authorities should
always be able to obtain as much assistance from their foreign counterparts as they are
willing to provide to those counterparts." Id.
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threatened United States interests; and second, a situation in which the
SEC wants to grant assistance to encourage future cooperation.' 52 The
Senate rejected the bill's reciprocity requirement, leaving the adopted Act
without such a provision. 53
B.

The Law as Adopted

"[Filing away ambition, by that sin fell the angels," Representative
John Dingell warned inside traders,'" invoking Shakespeare to support
passage of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 (Act).155 The Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,156
and includes only part of the SEC's proposal seeking authority to assist
foreign securities agencies.
Section 6 of the Act, entitled "Investigatory Assistance to Foreign Securities Authority," first defines the term "foreign securities authority"
as an organization, public or private, empowered to enforce that state's
securities laws. 15 7 The major substantive provision of section 6 authorizes the Commission to assist a foreign securities agency at that agency's
request.1 5 ' The request must state that the foreign agency "is conducting
an investigation which it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any" securities law or
rule administered by the requesting agency. 59 Assistance, while not required, is available at the discretion of the SEC; dual criminality is not
required.16 ° Congress promulgated two factors for the SEC to consider

152. Ruder Says, supra note 150, at 1236.
153. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4677, 4681 (1988) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988)).
154. 134 CONG. REC. H7465, H7469 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Dingell) (quoting Shakespeare's Henry VIII). Representative Dingell also likened inside
traders to Icarus, because of their fatal ambition. Id.
155. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
156. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
157. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6(a), 102 Stat. 4681-82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(50) (1988)).
158. Id. § 6(b), 102 Stat. 4681-82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988)).
159. Id.; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982) (setting forth standards for investigation).
160. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6(b), 102 Stat. 4681-82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78u(a)(2) (1988)). Dual criminality is the requirement that the alleged violation be a
crime under both the foreign law and United States law. The Commission was granted
authority to provide assistance "without regard to whether the facts stated in the request
would also constitute a violation of the laws of the United States." Id. Dual criminality
was favored by Commissioner Charles Cox of the SEC, but that standard was not
adopted by the Commission. SEC to Seek Authority, supra note 136, at 677.
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when deciding whether to assist the foreign authority: "whether (A) the
requesting authority has agreed to provide reciprocal assistance in securities matters to the Commission; and (B) compliance with the request
would prejudice the public interest of the United States." ' 61
Congress intends that international assistance proceed in the following
manner. The Act requires the foreign security authority to file a detailed
request, describing the facts that indicate a possible violation of the foreign state's law. The committee that submitted the bill included this requirement to prevent the Commission from assisting in "an unfocused or
unbounded foreign investigation. ' 162 If the SEC provides assistance, it
appoints officers to gather evidence following normal procedures. 63 The
mandate to follow normal procedures assures that witnesses will have the
same rights and protections as any witness involved in an SEC investigation."" These rights and protections include the rights as a subpoened
witness to view an order detailing the grounds and subject of the Commission's formal order indicating the purpose of the investigation and to
have full access to the usual challenges to a subpoena.1 5 Constitutional
due process and fourth amendment rights of a witness during testimony
are protected in the following manner:
[A] witness would be entitled to assert all relevant rights and privileges of
the United States. In addition, a witness would be entitled to assert privileges available in the country seeking the evidence even as to those matters
which are not privileged under U.S. law. Issues of privilege would be
preserved on the record of the investigative proceedings for later consideration by a court of the requesting authority. The Committee expects that
foreign countries providing reciprocal assistance to the Commission will
follow a familar [sic] procedure.166
The House Energy and Commerce Committee addressed reciprocity and
expressed its intent that the Commission should not assist a foreign
agency that refuses to offer similar assistance when in fact that agency is
authorized to provide some degree of investigative assistance.1 67 The
Commission is not required to condition its assistance on reciprocity,

161. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6(b), 102 Stat. 4681-82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78u(a)(2) (1988)).
162. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6066.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1381 & n.34 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting 17 C.F.R. 203.6-203.7 (1979)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
166. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6067 n.24.
167. Id. at 6067.
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however, because the Committee believed that such assistance may form
a foundation for future mutual cooperation."6 8 A two-fold purpose exists
for not requiring dual criminality: first, the requirement limits the Commission's ability to assist foreign agencies; and second, if other states require dual criminality, the relative broadness of the United States securities laws severely limits the SEC's possibility of assistance from a foreign
counterpart. 9
C.

Critique of Section 6

1. Legal Community Concerns: Come Back, King George
The SEC's capacity to assist foreign securities agencies traditionally
received support from the legal community; some concerns arise, however, with this capability. When the concept was first suggested in 1985,
one practitioner expressed his disgust for the idea, proclaiming, "Why
don't we just say we made a mistake and want King George to come
back and govern our country?"17 0 The practitioner further indicated that
he would advise his clients not to cooperate and envisioned the English
"sicking" the SEC on his client and then charging the client with obstruction of justice or perjury, even though "there is no legitimate interest here."1'
Other securities lawyers express their concerns about foreign investigators controlling the SEC, pointing out the variances in
standards of proof and rights of witnesses."7 2 Pragmatically, the additional responsibility and cost to the SEC of assisting foreign governments
concern many who are quick to mention that existing United States
budgetary ailments, such as deficits and fiscal restraint, may make the
implementation of these provisions unfeasible.17 3 Finally, the defense bar
recognizes the problems of representing a client under investigation by a
foreign agency; 17 4 effective assistance of counsel is restricted because of
the difficulty of defining the parameters of the investigation and control-

168. Id.
169. Id. at 6067-68.

170. Franklin, Wider Net: SEC Authority to Aid Foreign Prosecutions Sought,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1987, at 5, col. 5. (statement of Marvin Pickholz, partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of New York's Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpl, and member
of the ABA Subcommittee on Insider Trading).
171. Id. at 6, col. 6.
172. SEC Asks Congressfor New Powers, Nat'l L.J. News Service, Aug. 25, 1988
(LEXIS, NEXIS Library, PRNEWS File). But see infra text accompanying note 190.
173. Franklin, supra note 170, at 5, col. 5.
174. Id. at 6, col. 6.
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ling discovery.1 75 The only effective means of representing a client under
investigation is to associate with foreign counsel. 7 6
Michael Mann, Associate Enforcement Director at the SEC's Office
of International Affairs, addresses some of these concerns. He argues
that the United States has a vital interest in protecting both domestic and
foreign markets from fraud, and that in the long run the United States
will actually save money."' Indeed, present methods of international securities enforcement require a case by case approach, and bilateral
agreements, facilitated by the additional capabilities of the SEC that allow it to cooperate more fully with foreign agencies, improve
efficiency.' 7 8
2.

Is Section 6 Constitutional?

The recently signed United States-Canadian MOU'7 9 brought forth a
constitutional challenge in Canada, contesting the authority of Canadian
securities agencies to conduct investigations on behalf of the SEC in
Canada. 80 Similar concerns persist as to United States congressional authority to give the SEC reciprocal powers."8" Professor George Berman,
Professor of Law at Columbia University, while believing Congress has
the power to grant the substantive provisions of section 6 of the Act,
nevertheless believes the authority is best suited for an executive branch
82
agency.
Congress is constitutionally vested with the responsibility to "regulate

175. Id.
176. Id. Foreign counsel would be required for an understanding of the foreign
state's laws eventually applied to the client and the breadth of rights available to the
witness. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
180. SEC Asks Congressfor Power to ConductInvestigations to Aid Foreign Gov'ts,
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 875, 876 (June 10, 1988); Constitutional
Attack Mounted on Recent SEC Memorandum, Ontario Act, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 34, at 1337 (Aug. 26, 1988).
181. Franklin, supra note 170, at 6, col. 6.
182. Id. Conflicts, however, within the federal government over foreign policy would
be no greater than those already in existence. Former SEC General Counsel David
Goelzer suggested that, although not required, the SEC could "back off" if a conflict
were to arise. Id.; see also SEC to Seek Authority, supra note 136, at 677. SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest wanted to require, in the legislative proposal to Congress,
that the SEC consult with the Executive Branch before assisting foreign government
investigations, but this was not adopted. Id.
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Commerce with foreign Nations."18 Congress passed the Securities Ex1 84
change Act as a valid exercise of its power under the commerce clause.
To effect legislative intent, Congress gave the SEC broad investigatory
power,' 5 subpoena power,""' and power to petition the judiciary to enforce discovery demands . 8 7 The Commission's primary enforcement
mechanism is the subpoena.""8 The power to issue a subpoena is not
limited to situations in which there is "probable cause" nor even suspicion of illegal activity."8 9 In 1946, the United States Supreme Court announced a three-part test for determining the validity of an administrative agency's enforcement procedures:
The requirement of "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,"
literally applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an order
for production by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress
can order, and the docu90
ments sought are relevant to the inquiry.
Congress explicitly authorized investigations by the SEC in section 6
of the Act. Whether Congress possesses this power is another question.
Congress established the SEC to administer the Securities Exchange Act
and the amendments contained in the 1988 Act. The subpoena power
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204
F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affid on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). The power to
regulate foreign commerce is in Congress, not in the executive or the judiciary. Id. at
658.
184. SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds,
87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937).

185. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1988).
186. Id. § 78u(b).
187. Id. § 78u(c).
188. HousE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 31 (statement of Professor Hurd).
189. United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632 (1950). The Court wrote that administrative agencies have the
power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the
judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend
on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to
an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to whether there
is probable violation of the law.
Id. at 642; see also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
190. Oklahoma Press Pub. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). "It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be
pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be
for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command." Id. at
208-09.
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delegated by statute to the SEC is within the limits of congressional
power.""' The power of Congress to regulate commerce, including foreign commerce, is expressed in the Constitution. The authority of a federal administrative agency to investigate a person in the United States on
behalf of a foreign government is a "necessary and proper '' x92 means to
the effective and legitimate end of protecting not only United States financial markets from fraud, but also of ensuring that the United States
is not used as a haven for persons actively defrauding participants in
markets around the world.
Another question arises as to whether targets of investigation have
constitutional rights. The third requirement in the Supreme Court's test
for enforcing an administrative subpoena is a "relevancy" standard. This
standard requires that the materials sought be plainly competent and
relevant to a lawful purpose. 93 Potential defendants are also protected
by the reasonableness requirement applicable to all administrative
agency investigations.'" Congress intended to afford subjects of joint
SEC-foreign inquisitions their applicable fourth and fifth amendment
rights.1 9 A person under investigation, however, is protected even without this expression of intent because investigations by federal officials are
conducted under the guise of constitutional standards. 9 ' Further, although as a general rule a court can compel an immunized witness to
testify, the fifth amendment notwithstanding, 9 ' dicta in one Supreme
Court decision imply the opposite when such testimony could incriminate the witness under foreign law. 9

191. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 510 (1943).
192. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
193. SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (quoting Endicolt, 317 U.S. at 509).
194. Oklahoma Press,327 U.S. at 208. "The gist of the protections [in the validity of
subpoenas] is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not
be unreasonable." Id.
195. See HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6067 n.24.
196. See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968). The fourth
amendment applies to raids by foreign officials only if federal agents so substantially
participate in the raids as to convert them into joint ventures between United States and
foreign officials. Id. at 743.
197. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
198. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 481 (1972). Mr.
Zicarelli was given immunity in exchange for testimony concerning mob activities in
New Jersey, but he refused to answer certain questions because the answers would expose him to danger of foreign prosecution. He argued that neither immunity nor the fifth
amendment can prevent the use of the testimony by a foreign sovereign. The Supreme
Court refused to rule on the issue because "[ilt is well established that the privilege
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Section 6 passes constitutional muster. The Act is a legitimate exercise
of broad congressional powers under the commerce clause. A person
targeted by a foreign agency for investigation still has substantial constitutional protections. Additionally, the SEC can prevent unwarranted inquiries through its discretionary powers in determining whether to commence an investigation on behalf of a foreign government. The
Commission rarely wastes its limited resources on fishing expeditions.19
3.

Has Congress Fallen Short?

Representative Edward Markey, °° speaking in support of the Act,
declared that the measure "will, in fact, begin to convince the investing
public that the Congress is taking action that can give them some reason
to believe that insider trading is something that will not be tolerated by
the Congress or by the courts."20 1 Congress did make some rather dramatic changes in the law. The Act increases criminal penalties,20 2 imposes liability on control persons, 20 3 authorizes bounties to informants, 0 4
and codifies an already implied private right of action.2 0 5 These substantial tools in the enforcement of United States securities laws provide deterrence; nevertheless, a smart professional can still trade on inside information by the use of foreign bank accounts if the trader selects the right
sovereign (such as Panama or Luxembourg) and utilizes enough protective layering.2" 6 The SEC proposed additional measures designed further
to enable it to police-and to aid other sovereigns in their efforts to police-international securities markets.
The SEC requested amendments to the Freedom of Information Act

protects against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities." Id. at 478. The
Court did not consider that questions about New Jersey crimes could present a problem
of foreign incrimination. "Should [Mr. Zicarelli] have found it necessary to qualify his
answer by confining, it to domestic responsibilities in order to avoid incrimination under
foreign law, he could have done so." Id. at 481.
199. See HousE CRrTCISM, supra note 11, at 8 (explaining the SEC's reluctance to
conduct investigations involving foreign trades).
200. Representative Markey (D-Mass.) cosponsored H.R. 4945. See supra note 148.
201. 134 CONG. REC. H7465, H7468 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Markey). "The average investor must be assured that the securities marketplace is above
all else a fair and level playing field and not a steep, rigid incline." Id.
202. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 4, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)

(1988)).
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. § 3, 102 Stat. 4677-80 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988)).
Id.
Id. § 5, 102 Stat. 4680-81 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988)).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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(FOIA) 207 to ensure confidentiality of evidence obtained by the Commission from a foreign agency.208 The Senate Bill would have created a
narrow exception to keep the same information confidential in the
United States that is kept confidential by foreign law.2"' In favor of this
bill, the Senate Report indicated that the "adoption of such an amendment will almost certainly allow the SEC to obtain otherwise unobtainable confidential documents from foreign countries for law enforcement
purposes. These considerations warrant enactment of the FOIA exemption."2 0 FOIA disclosure is one of the most serious causes of foreign
government reluctance to provide assistance and information to the
SEC.2" The failure of Congress to provide this exemption therefore will
probably bar further negotiation of bilateral agreements near
completion.2 2
This deficiency is an obvious flaw in the present law. The SEC
needed the "we'll scratch your back, if you'll scratch ours" bait promulgated in section 6 of the Act. Once, however, a foreign government realizes that information provided under any agreement is subject to disclosure under the FOIA, the foreign government becomes reluctant to
cooperate. The significance of this flaw is multiplied by the fact that the
most crucial information in an international insider trading investigation
is the identity of secret bank account customers-information the potentially cooperating sovereign may protect under its strong public policy
and secrecy laws. Congress lowers the bait, but it fails to attract any
takers. No rationale for this oversight exists; immediate correction is
vital.
V.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION

ACT OF 1989:

CONGRESS CONTINUES TO FALL SHORT

On 1 March 1989, the SEC submitted to Congress the proposed International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989.213 The
SEC requested the enactment of an exemption to the FOIA to prevent

207.
208.

SENATE REPORT,

209.

S.2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(d) (1988), reprintedin SENATE REPORT,

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
supra note 146, at 10-11.

supra note 146, at 37.
210. Id. at 10.
211.
Reg. &
212.
213.
Reg. &

SEC Has Sought Enforcement Help under Swiss Treaty, Attorney Says, 20 Sec.
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1294, 1295 (Aug. 19, 1988).
Id.
SEC Asks Congress to Increase InternationalEnforcement Powers, 21 Sec.
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 341 (Mar. 3, 1989).
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the disclosure of documents provided by foreign securities agencies to the
SEC.21 4 This exemption is crucial because foreign securities agencies
often refuse to enter into MOUs with the SEC until assurances are provided that the documents and any testimony submitted to the SEC by the
foreign securities agency will remain confidential.2 15 The Commission
argued that the legislation would not undermine the policy behind the
FOIA:2 18
If the Commission never obtains documents because there is n6 MOU in a
given case, the documents will never be subject to a FOIA disclosure obligation in the first instance ....

[A]doption of such an amendment will

almost certainly allow the Commission to obtain for law enforcement purposes otherwise unobtainable confidential documents from foreign
countries. 21 7

Further, the SEC argued that "principles of comity make it appropriate
to exempt from disclosure confidential documents obtained from a foreign government if those documents could not be disclosed under the
'218
laws of the foreign country.
On 25 September 1989, the United States House of Representatives
passed H.R. 1396 in response to the SEC's proposed measure. 21 9 H.R.
1396 contains the FOIA exemption requested by the SEC. The bill provides in part:
Except as provided in subsection (e), the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose records obtained from a foreign securities authority if (1)
the foreign securities authority here has in good faith determined and represented to the Commission that public disclosure of such records would
violate the laws applicable to that foreign securities authority, and (2) the
Commission obtains such records pursuant to (A) such procedure as the
Commission may authorize for use in connection with the administration
or enforcement of the securities laws, or (B) a memorandum of
220
understanding.
Subsection (e) excepts from the FOIA exemption information provided

214. Id.
215. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 240, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter
HOUSE REPORT].

216. Id. at 23.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. House Approves SEC-Drafted Bill to Limit Access to Foreign Documents, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1463 (Sept. 29, 1989).
220., H.R. 1396, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(2), 135 CONG. REc. H5870, H5870
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) (intended to amend 15 U.S.C. § 78x)).
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to the SEC in three instances:22 1 (1) when the Right to Finance Privacy
Act applies; 222 (2) when Congress requests the information; or (3) when
the information is requested pursuant to "an order of a court of the
United States 22in an action commenced by the United States or the
Commission.""
The FOIA exemption that the SEC originally requested was altered
to its final form, quoted above, to preserve the integrity of the FOIA.224
The exemption passed by the House of Representatives was supported
by the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American
Society of Newspaper Editors.22 5
H.R. 1396 also contains several other provisions regarding the international securities market. These provisions include:
(1) Authority for the
SEC to allow access to its files by foreign law en226
forcement officials;
(2) Authority for the SEC
to sanction securities professionals for violating
227
foreign securities laws;

(3) Authority for SROs to prevent
persons convicted under foreign law
228
from membership in an SRO;
(4) Authority for the SEC to accept reimbursement for expenses incurred

221. Id. at H5870-71.
222. Id.
223. Id. at H5871.
224. 135 CONG. REC. at H5873 (statement of Rep. Markey).
225. Letter of Craig Klugman and Terry Maguire to Reps. Edward Markey and
Matthew J. Rinaldo (Aug. 15, 1989), reprinted in id. (The legislation is "an acceptable
solution which protects the interest of the SEC while prescribing a strong FOIA.").
These associations objected to the original language of the bill; they believed that the
original proposal would have authorized the SEC to withhold documents beyond the
scope of the Commission's concerns, and the language could be interpreted to "deny
adequate judicial review of whether the standards permitting the withholding of relevant
documents had been met." Id.
The standar4 for confidentiality in the original corresponding Senate bill was whether
the "foreign securities authority has in good faith represented to the Commission that
public disclosure of such records would be contrary to the laws applicable to that foreign
securities authority." S.646, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a), 135 CONG. REc. S3041,
S3041 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1989) (intended to amend 15 U.S.C. § 78x).
226. H.R. 1396, § 2(a)(2), at H5870. For a form letter to be used by foreign securities agencies, see infra appendix.
227. See H.R. 1396, § 3(a), at H5871 (intended to amend 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)). Section 3 of H.R. 1396 has raised concerns over the due process rights of those sanctioned.

See Enforcement Bills ForeignProvisions Raise Due Process Concerns, Lawyers Say, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1497, 1497-98 (Oct. 6, 1989).
228. H.R. 1396, § 3(b), at H5871 (intended to amend 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(39)); see
also supra note 85 (defining SRO).

INTERNATIONAL INSIDER TRADING

1990]

on behalf of foreign governmental authorities.229
Representative Markey suggested at the time that this legislation
would be an important step toward global securities enforcement cooperation:2 30 "Both the business communities and governments in these nations have come to recognize the importance of this approach in attracting investors and raising capital in the market place."'2 3
H.R. 1396 has not become law. After passage in the House, the Senate delayed action until 16 November 1989, when the Senate considered
H.R. 1396.212 The Senate, however, struck everything after the enacting
clause and inserted the text of S. 1712.233 S. 1712 contains other material
concering the SEC as well as the original SEC proposal,2 34 but these
additions require further consideration by the House before the FOIA
exemption is ready for President Bush's approval. Hence, despite the
"swift pace of globalization,"2
leaving international regulation in its
trail, the Senate's amendments to H.R. 1396-amendments not even
concerning the FOIA exemption-delay any further agreements between
the SEC and foreign securities agencies for investigative assistance.238

VI.
A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

House Committee Suggestions

The House Committee on Government Operations, which recently
criticized the SEC's enforcement efforts in cases involving international
trading," 7 made several recommendations to the Commission and Congress. 23 The most prominent of these suggests that the SEC should not
emphasize the use of MOUs; the House Committee prefers, instead, that
the SEC obtain congressional authority to prohibit securities trading
from states that will not enter into an MOU.1 9 The Committee also

229.

H.R. 1396, § 7, at H5872 (intended to amend 15 U.S.C. 78d(c)).

230.

135 CONG. REc. at H5873.

231. Id.
232. [1 1989-19901 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,827.
233.

See 135 CONG. REC. S15,909-17 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1989).

234. Id.
235.

135 CONG. REc. at H5873 (statement of Rep. Markey).

236.

The Senate has indefinitely postponed consideration of S. 1712. [1 1989-1990]

Cong. Index (CCH) 21,827.
237. HOUSE CRrrlcisM, supra note 11.
238. Id. at 11-12.

239. Id. This suggested prohibition is similar to the CFTC's Rule 21.03. See 17
C.F.R. § 21.03 (1989). The Report recognized the importance of MOUs, but stated that

inherent limitations in these agreements suggest the need for a more comprehensive and
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suggests that the SEC establish an interagency group, with representatives from the United States Justice Department, State Department, and
Internal Revenue Service, to coordinate international law enforcement.2 40
A further suggestion urges Congress to grant expanded long arm jurisdiction to the Commission. This would authorize the Commission's service of subpoenas outside the United States while respecting the sovereignty of foreign states.24 1 The Commodities Future Trading
Commission (CFTC) possesses this authority and utilizes the power as
an effective deterrent to illegal trading originated abroad. 242 The Committee also urges the SEC to mandate that foreign banks trading in
United States markets identify the beneficial owners of accounts involved
in suspicious trading. 243 Finally, Congress could possibly consider a unilateral approach to global securities enforcement. 244 The "waiver-byconduct" method of enforcement, first presented in 1984, proposes that a
transaction in United States securities markets constitutes consent to disclosure of information relating to the trade-even information entitled to
protection under foreign law.24 5 Congress shelved the waiver-by-conduct

proposal after considerable criticism. 246 Critics argue that the concept
leads to retaliatory measures by foreign states and the potential for the
extraterritorial application of United States laws, which would eventually hinder international cooperation. 24' Additionally, the implied consent to disclosure probably would cause foreign investors to withdraw
their capital and invest in other markets,24 8 a result that potentially
could lead to financial disaster. Over $400 billion in trades were conducted by foreigners in the United States securities markets during 1987.

reliable
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

international enforcement approach. HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 11.
HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 17.
Id. at 15.
SEC Request, supra note 68; see also Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver

By Conduct-A Possible Response to the Internationalizationof the Securities Markets,
6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 1 (1984).

246. HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 15 n.25; see also Bschorr, "Waiver By
Conduct": Another View, 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 307 (1984); Lpine, A
Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct", 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 319

(1984); Singer, The InternationalizedSecurities Market and InternationalLaw-A Reply to John M. Fedders, 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 345 (1984).
247.
248.

Comment, supra note 9, at 317-18.
HOUSE CRITICISM, supra note 11, at 16.
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B.

Additional Recommendations

As previously mentioned, Congress must seriously consider the amendments to the FOIA as proposed by the SEC. Information that foreign
law requires to be kept confidential is not available for sharing with the
SEC if such information is subject to public observation. Indeed, as
stated earlier, foreign securities agencies refuse to enter into MOUs with
the SEC because of the possible disclosure under the FOIA of information that they might be required to provide to the SEC.2 49 Congress

should also expand the long arm jurisdiction of the Commission, similar
to the expansion it already has afforded the CFTC. Once cooperation is
established, the SEC can efficiently perform service extraterritorially,
subject to the protection of the sovereign interests of both states.
The SEC should also modify its policy regarding MOUs. Although
MOUs will continue to be a valid mechanism for international securities
enforcement, their role as the primary means of cooperation requires
modification. Until every sovereign in the world agrees to enter into a
bilateral agreement with the SEC, a haven will always exist for the origination of illegal trading on United States markets.2 50 The desire of a
state to have capital flowing into its banks will always deter some states
from either repealing bank secrecy laws or subjecting account identification to potential discovery under an MOU. In light of this persistent
problem, notably the United States is not the only state interested in
protecting financial markets. The United States, therefore, should establish multilateral cooperation either through a treaty or through a multinational securities regulatory committee.2 "' Either of these regimes are
difficult to establish because of the variances in regulatory standards and
policies in the different states.252 A rough set of guidelines could further
the basis of international standards. Multinational cooperation in securities regulation is feasible. Recently, representatives of ten states and Interpol met in Washington, D.C. to coordinate investigations regarding
one of the largest international securities fraud cases to date. 25 3 This co249. See text accompanying note 215.
250. See Comment, supra note 9, at 318.
251. WASH. & LEE Note, supra note 9, at 1172; see Williams & Spencer, Regulation of InternationalSecurities Markets: Towards a Greater Cooperation,4 J. CoMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 279 (Mar. 1982). Williams and Spencer propose the establishment by multilateral treaty of an international committee of security regulators. Id. at
284-85.
252. Id. at 285.
253. Enforcement Officials Meet to Coordinate Fraud Inquiry, 20 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1554 (Oct. 14, 1988). The European Economic Community is
formulating a uniform insider trading law, which will aid enforcement officials through-
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operation could lay the foundation for further multinational
coordination.
Congress should not establish unilateral, protectionist means of securities enforcement. Enough barriers exist to the exchange of evidence, information, and cooperation today without Congress creating another.
The economies of the world have transcended national boundaries and
are rapidly evolving into one truly global economy. The efficient, free
flow of capital from market to market furthers this process. Securities
regulatory bodies should accept these facts and work for greater interdependence. The attraction of secret bank accounts will continue to draw
capital; if alternative means of discovery are not effective in protecting
the markets from abuses furthered by these accounts, prohibition of trading with these accounts should be required only in extreme cases. Further, all the major financial centers must ban the use of secret accounts
to frustrate effectively their use. It is, however, unlikely such concerted
activity will happen.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The world securities and financial markets are rapidly evolving into
globalized, twenty-four hour markets. Regulatory bodies must quickly
prepare a legal and financial framework for international, multilateral
cooperation.25 4 Ad hoc bilateral cooperation, although a foundation for
multilateral cooperation, is not a viable long-term solution.2 5 5 The SEC
must focus on establishing a multinational regime. Congress at least has
acknowledged the problem, but the enactment of section 6 is just
that-an acknowledgment. Section 6 provides little more than a rocky
base for further legislation. Congress should amend the FOIA as proposed by the Commission, and formulate further measures that enhance
multinational cooperation.
Any legislation should include roles for both the SEC and executive
branch agencies25" in recognition of the inherent foreign policy issues
out the community. Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, Secrecy Laws and Other Obstacles to
International Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 287, 294-95 (Mar.
1982). For an analysis of the recent EEC Directive on Insider Trading, see Note, A New
Look at the European Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading,23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 135 (1990).

254. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 774.
255. WAsH. & LEE Note, supra note 9, at 1166.
256. The SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ) already have established a framework for reviewing requests by foreign securities agencies for investigative assistance.
The cooperative efforts will include the following:
1. The SEC will give the foreign securities agency request to the DOJ and allow

1990]
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involved. The creation of an international environment that is conducive
to free market forces yet free from abuses is difficult to establish. International coordination of securities regulation remains the best hope to
melt the waxen wings of inside traders.2 57
John Thornell Thomas*

the DOJ a reasonable time to provide comments to the SEC before the SEC will
begin an investigation on behalf of the foreign government;
2. The SEC will notify the DOJ prior to the enforcement of any subpoena issued
at the request of the foreign securities agency;
3. "The SEC staff will consult with the DOJ Office of International Affairs regarding the selection of countries for negotriation of" MOUs.
SEC, DO] Set up Frameworkfor Reviewing Foreign Requestsfor Investigative Help, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 295 (Feb. 24, 1989).
257. 134 CONG. REC. H7469 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dingell);
see Global Recognition of LegalJudgments Next Big Enforcement Issue, Mann Advises,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1665 (Nov. 10, 1989) (interview with Michael
Mann, SEC Office of International Affairs, Associate Enforcement Director).
* To my mother, Elizabeth Oglesby Johnson, and to Edward Johnson, as I try to
heed the wisdom of Proverbs 1:8-9, and in memory of my father, John Larry Thomas,
who introduced me to the stock market when I was seven years old. Their wisdom and
memory continue to discipline and guide me.
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APPENDIX

Access Request by Foreign Government
Dear
We request access to the investigative and other non-public files of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") related
to captioned matter. This request is made in connection with an ongoing
lawful investigation or official proceedings inquiring into a violation Of,
or failure to comply with, a criminal or civil statute or regulation, rule
or order issued pursuant thereto, being conducted by [name of requesting
agency].
We will establish and maintain such safeguards as are necessary and
appropriate to protect the confidentiality of files to which access is
granted and information derived therefrom. The files and information
may, however, be used for the purposes of our investigation and/or proceedings, and any resulting proceedings. They also may be transferred to
our government's criminal law enforcement authorities and self-regulatory organizations subject to our oversight. We shall notify you of any
such transfer and use our best efforts to obtain appropriate assurances of
confidentiality.
Other than as set forth in the procceding [sic] paragraph, we will:
Make no public use of these files or information without prior approval of your staff;
Notify you of any legally enforceable demand for the files or information prior to complying with the demand, and assert such legal exemptions or privileges on your behalf as you may request; and
Not grant any other demand or request for the files or information
without prior notice to the lack of objection by your staff.
We recognize that until this matter has been closed, the Commission
continues to have an interest and will take further investigatory or other
steps as it considers necessary in the discharge of its duties and
responsibilities.
Should you have any questions, please contact
Source: H.R.

REP.

No. 240, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1989).

